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Abstract 
 
 
 
Vietnamese poultry are host to co-circulating subtypes of avian influenza 
viruses, including H5N1 and H9N2, which pose a great risk to poultry productivity 
and to human health. AIVs circulate throughout the poultry trade network in Vietnam, 
with live bird markets being an integral component to this network. Traders at LBMs 
exhibit a variety of trading practices, which may influence the transmission of AIVs. 
We  identified  trading  practices  that  impacted  on  AIV  prevalence  in  chickens 
marketed in northern Vietnamese LBMs. We generated sequencing data for  31 
H9N2 and 2 H5N6 viruses. Viruses isolated in the same LBM or from chickens 
sourced from the same province were genetically closer than viruses isolated in 
different LBMs or from chickens sourced in different provinces. The position of a 
vendor  in  the  trading  network  impacted  on  their  odds  of  having  AIV  infected 
chickens. Being a retailer and purchasing chickens from middlemen was associated 
with increased odds of infection, whereas odds decreased if vendors purchased 
chickens directly from large farms. Odds of infection were also higher for vendors 
having a greater volume of ducks unsold per day. These results indicate how the 
spread of AIVs is influenced by the structure of the live poultry trading network. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Avian influenza viruses (AIVs), including H5N1 and H9N2, are endemic within 
poultry production systems in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and 
pose a significant threat to food security and to human health. Zoonotic outbreaks 
incur a severe economic burden through patient medical costs and stamping out 
programmes that can run into billions of dollars, while persistence of AIVs in poultry 
rearing  systems  causes  poultry  morbidity  and  mortality  (Alexander  2007,  Otte, 
 
Hinrichs et al. 2008, Qi, Jiang et al. 2014). Humans are immunologically naïve to 
AIVs, however sporadic human cases are reported each year from countries with 
high levels of AIV endemicity, and although sustained transmission in humans does 
not occur, there is a clear ongoing threat of pandemic emergence for these viruses 
(Uyeki, Chong et al. 2002). 
 
 
 
Poultry  production  and  trade  in  LMICs  is  heterogeneous,  with  different 
species being brought together from various size farming systems, often without 
robust biosecurity (Webster 2004, Fournié, Tripodi et al. 2016). Live bird markets 
(LBMs) are a traditional aspect of these systems that facilitate the storage and sale 
of live poultry including chickens, ducks, quail and pigeons. As a consequence, 
LBMs play a significant role in the maintenance and spread of AIVs and thus pose a 
zoonotic risk to poultry workers and consumers, and to temporary workers enlisted 
during stamping out programmes (Mounts, Kwong et al. 1999, Bridges, Lim et al. 
2002). LBMs have been a primary target for AIV control strategies; during a zoonotic 
outbreak of H7N9 in China in 2013, closure of LBMs was shown to be remarkably 
effective in reducing the risk of human infection by up to 99% (Yu, Wu et al. 2014). 
Control strategies in LBMs have also been shown to significantly reduce AIV 
detection in chickens: the most effective strategies include monthly rest days that 
involve routine market closure followed by slaughter of unsold poultry, a ban to the 
sale of live quail, and a ban to overnight storage of live poultry (Kung, Guan et al. 
2003, Lau, Leung et al. 2007, Leung, Lau et al. 2012). However, although rest days 
are effective at breaking the viral amplification cycle in LBMs, they do not prevent re- 
introduction of virus. Indeed, rest days/nights are an important component of long- 
term AIV control but are not sufficient alone to eliminate infection (Kung, Guan et al. 
 
2003). Furthermore, risk factor studies in LBMs have shown that having a greater 
variety of poultry species, including ducks being sold alongside other species, having 
poor sanitary conditions, storing poultry in floor pens instead of cages, and having ≥1 
wholesaler trading in LBMs, all increase the odds of having AIV infected poultry, 
and/or having AIV contaminated environments (Santhia, Ramy et al. 2009, Kirunda, 
Mugimba et al. 2015, Sayeed, Smallwood et al. 2017, Kim, Biswas et al. 2018, 
Wang, Cheng et al. 2018). 
 
 
 
Vietnam has enzootic H5N1 and H9N2 and is at risk of incursion by H7N9 due 
to a shared border with China (Thuy, Peacock et al. 2016). Poultry traders are an 
integral component of poultry production in Vietnam. They transport poultry from 
farms to LBMs, shaping a live poultry trading network through which AIVs may 
spread. Traders’ practices may thus impact on the likelihood of introducing AIVs in 
LBMs, and also facilitate the amplification of AIV circulation within marketed chicken 
populations (Fournié, Guitian et al. 2012). However, a quantitative assessment of the 
association between poultry management practices and AIV prevalence in marketed 
chickens is lacking. To address this gap, AIV infection status of chickens in 
Vietnamese LBMs was assessed and the practices of traders offering them for sale 
characterised. This allowed us to assess the extent to which those practices may 
impact on the risk of viral circulation in LBMs. 
 
Results 
 
Influenza virus A prevalence in live bird markets 
 
Eight live bird markets (6 retail, 2 wholesale) in four provinces of northern 
Vietnam were included in our study, which was conducted between 2nd October 2017 
and 3rd December 2017 (see Methods for detailed sampling strategy). Of 493 pooled 
oropharyngeal  swabs  from  chickens,  169  (34%)  were  confirmed  positive  for 
influenza virus A by reverse transcription-qPCR (RT-qPCR) targeting the matrix (M) 
gene (Ct<35) (Table 1). Subtyping of M gene positives with a Ct<26 (n=113) showed 
that 96% (n=109) of pools had H9, 14.1% (n=16) had H5, 12.3% (n=14) had H9 and 
H5 co-detected and 1.7% (n=2) could not be subtyped. There were no samples with 
detectable H7 influenza virus. Influenza virus prevalence varied greatly between 
LBMs with the two wholesale LBMs having the least amount of detectable influenza 
virus (Table 1). Of the 154 pooled environmental swabs, 70 (45%) were confirmed 
positive for influenza virus A. The proportion of positive pooled samples was similar 
across the different market areas that were sampled: poultry stall area (38%, n=27); 
waste area (34%, n=24) and slaughter area (27%, n=19) (birds were not slaughtered 
in one LBM, for which it was not therefore possible to collect swabs samples for 
slaughter or waste sites). 
 
 
 
 
Phylogenetic analysis 
 
 
Next generation sequencing (NGS) of M gene positive samples yielded whole 
genome sequence data for 12 H9N2 viruses, and partial genomes for 19 H9N2 and 
2 H5N6 viruses. H9N2 viruses sequenced in this study were most closely related to 
previously  sequenced  H9N2  viruses  from  Vietnam  (Thuy,  Peacock  et  al.  2016) 
 
(Figure 1 and S1). For example, BLASTn analysis of the PB1 gene of 
A/chicken/Vietnam/1DO10/2017 from this study was most closely related to 
A/chicken/Vietnam/H7F-BG4-383 with nucleotide homology of 98%. These viruses 
retained the G57-like genotype, a prevalent genotype of H9N2 viruses in China 
known to be donors of all six internal genes to zoonotic H7N9 and H10N8 viruses 
(Pu, Wang et al. 2015). 
 
We assessed whether the genetic distance between viral isolates was 
associated with their sampling location and the origin of chickens (i.e. the LBM that 
chickens were sampled in, the LBM/farm type that poultry originated from, or the 
province that poultry originated from). To do this, we utilised the 12 Vietnamese 
H9N2 viruses which we had full genome sequence data for and concatenated their 
open reading frames. The genetic distance between any two of the 12 fully 
sequenced H9N2 isolates decreased if these two isolates originated from the same 
LBM (Mantel test, r=-0.41, p=0.004), or sampled chickens were sourced in the same 
province  (r=-0.37,  p=0.031)  (see  Table  S1  for  genotype  distribution  between 
sampled LBM and province source). In light of this, we were able to classify viruses 
into seven different sub-genotypes using a >98% nucleotide difference cut-off for 
each gene segment (for viruses where full genome sequencing data was available) 
(Figure 2). From this we could see that several strains which originated from the 
same LBM were also grouped into the same genotype; Genotype VN4 contained 
three viruses from LBM Pho Hien, and genotype VN5 contained three viruses from 
LBM Do. HA and NP genes had the greatest maximum nucleotide pairwise distance 
with 6.7% and 6.9%, respectively, followed by NS with 5.7%, NA with 5%, PB1 with 
4%, PB2 with 3.9%, M with 1.6% and PA with 1.5%. 
 
Molecular characteristics of virus isolates 
 
 
All H9N2 viruses were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses due to 
the presence of a dibasic cleavage motif RSSR/G in the haemagglutinin (HA) 
glycoprotein. However, the partial sequencing data for the HA genes of the H5N6 
viruses contained the polybasic cleavage motif RRKR/G, classifying them as highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (Chen, Lee et al. 1998). All sequenced NA 
genes of the H9N2 viruses contained a 3 amino acid deletion between residues 62 
and 64. Deletions in the stalk of NA are associated with adaptation of avian influenza 
viruses (AIVs) to chickens (Sorrell, Song et al. 2010), however a functional balance 
between  HA  and  NA  must  be  maintained  which  may  be  reflected  here  by  the 
retention of a NA stalk deletion, the continued HA1 glycosylation at residues 11, 123, 
200 (6/16 sequenced HAs), 280, 287 and 295, and the receptor binding site residues 
A/T180, L216 and M217 (mature H9 numbering), which may have a variable impact 
on receptor binding (Castrucci and Kawaoka 1993, Baigent and McCauley 2001, 
Sealy, Yaqub et al. 2019). As previously reported, H9N2 viruses in Vietnam continue 
to retain the PB2 E627 amino acid and show no markers of resistance to 
neuraminidase inhibitors (Thuy, Peacock et al. 2016). 
 
 
 
 
Risk factors associated with influenza virus A infection in chickens 
 
 
Univariable analysis was used to identify potential risk factors related to the 
origin and management of poultry by traders, and subsequently included in 
multivariable analysis. Thirteen of 19 explanatory variables were identified as having 
a significant association with influenza virus A infection in chickens (Table 2): e.g. 
poultry being sold by retailers, sourced from other LBMs, sourced from middlemen, 
 
increased frequency of having unsold birds, having greater numbers of unsold ducks 
per day, storing unsold birds at home, and increased number of days of trading in 
the LBM, had a strong positive association with influenza virus infection in chickens. 
Sourcing birds from large commercial farms and selling more chickens per day were 
negatively associated with influenza virus infection in chickens. 
 
In the final multivariable model, the sampled LBM was used as a random 
effect because poultry traders were naturally grouped into the eight selected LBMs. 
Three risk factors and one protective factor were identified. The risk factors included 
sourcing poultry from middlemen, selling poultry to consumers, and having a greater 
number of ducks unsold per day (Table 3). The protective factor was selling more 
chickens per day. 
 
 
 
 
Summary of poultry vendor practices 
 
 
To  put  the  identified  risk  factors  into  a  broader  context,  we  summarised 
poultry trading practices that were associated with the identified risks. Vendors who 
reported sourcing their birds from large commercial farms also sold a relatively large 
volume of chickens, with a median of 200 (IQR=434) chickens sold per day. These 
vendors also primarily sold to other vendors (selling to: vendors=75, consumers=14, 
both=69). In contrast, vendors who reported sourcing their birds from middlemen 
sold a relatively small volume of chickens, with a median of 15 (IQR=20) chickens 
sold per day. These vendors were also seen to primarily sell directly to consumers 
(selling to: vendors=9, consumers=60, both=27). 
 
Discussion 
 
 
In our study we have shown the G57-like genotype of LPAI H9N2 viruses 
continues to co-circulate with HPAI H5 viruses in Vietnam. We show there is reduced 
virus diversity between viruses from the same LBM and from the same province as 
compared to viruses from different LBMs and different provinces. This may indicate 
that populations of viruses that are genetically distinct are present within discrete 
parts of the poultry trade network. We also showed that trade practices influence the 
risks of influenza virus A detections in chickens. Given that H9N2 and H5Nx viruses 
are co-circulating, risk mitigation strategies are likely to be effective against multiple 
subtypes. 
 
A previous study by Fournie et al. has shown that it is possible to identify 
specific and distinct trader profiles of LBM sellers in Vietnam (Fournié, Guitian et al. 
2012). As such, traders are classified as retailers or wholesalers based on who they 
primarily sell poultry to; retailers primarily sell directly to consumers whereas 
wholesalers primarily sell to other poultry vendors within the trading network. In our 
study we show retailers experienced higher odds of infection due to their trading 
practices. The retailers in our study were those who sourced their birds from 
middlemen, sold a relatively small volume of chickens, and primarily sold directly to 
consumers. The risk factors associated with influenza virus A infection in chickens, 
selling only to consumers and buying from middlemen, can therefore be linked to 
retailers,  which  highlights  their  potential  role  in  disseminating  virus  through  the 
poultry trade network. In contrast, the wholesalers in our study were those who 
sourced from large commercial farms, sold a large volume of chickens, and primarily 
sold  to  other  vendors.  The  protective  risk  factor  of  selling  more  chickens  is 
 
associated with the practices of wholesalers and identifies this group of poultry 
traders as relatively low risk. 
 
When  considering  the  potential  impact  on  AIV  dissemination  that  these 
traders can have, it is important to take note of the position that vendors have in the 
poultry  trade  network.  Vendors  who  have  strong  connections  to  a  network  of 
contacts operating in and around LBMs would be expected to have a more 
pronounced role in disseminating AIVs, whereas vendors holding a loose link to a 
network of contacts may have a reduced impact on AIV dissemination (Fournié, 
Tripodi et al. 2016). Thus, middlemen are mobile, highly connected poultry traders 
that travel between farms and LBMs to purchase and sell birds, mixing poultry from 
many different sources. As a consequence, they facilitate a network of LBMs that are 
tractable to the circulation of influenza viruses (Fournié, Guitian et al. 2012, Fournié, 
Guitian et al. 2013). The identification of middlemen supplying poultry to traders as a 
risk factor for influenza virus infection could be explained by their mobility and 
propensity to mix poultry, and their high connectivity to the poultry trade network. 
Likewise, retailers could be associated with higher odds of infection because they 
may purchase birds that have ‘changed hands’ multiple times, promoting the amount 
of time spent by birds within the trade network and facilitating the mixing of birds 
from different sources. All the LBMs included in this study were open seven days a 
week, which would allow for greater connectivity between traders as they have more 
opportunity to interact at LBMs, potentially increasing the risk posed by retailers in 
particular. Although we did not explicitly capture the structure of the trade network in 
our study, the trading practices that we assessed can be used as indicators for the 
position of traders within the trade network. 
 
In Vietnam, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in spatially 
dispersed communes were shown to be closely linked to practices in agri-livestock 
farming systems, which involve communities producing rice, and domestic aquatic 
birds and chickens (Pfeiffer, Minh et al. 2007). These systems necessitate the use of 
areas with surface water such as river deltas, and therefore introduce the risk of 
mixing wild aquatic birds with domestic aquatic birds and chickens. Duck farming 
often involves raising and storing ducks in open bodies of water, which introduces 
the risk for wild waterfowl to mix with farmed ducks and transmit influenza viruses. In 
addition, studies have shown longer virus shedding times for LPAI-infected ducks, up 
to  11.5  days,  compared  to  LPAI-infected  chickens,  up  to  6  days  (Hénaux  and 
Samuel 2011, James, Howard et al. 2016). Therefore, poultry traders with larger 
numbers of unsold ducks could increase the transmission window for ducks to infect 
chickens,  especially  as  unsold  ducks  may  have  repeated  exposures  to  wild 
waterfowl when traders store unsold ducks at home. 
Effective control of avian influenza requires understanding risk factors 
associated with contamination of all aspects of poultry production. Contamination of 
the environment in LBMs and of utensils used for handling live and slaughtered 
poultry has been well documented; risk factors associated with environmental 
contamination of LBMs include ‘in-house’ poultry slaughtering, and their location in 
regions  which  see  great  chicken  density  and  poultry-related  activity  (Indriani, 
Samaan et al. 2010). Avian influenza viruses are frequently detected in shared 
poultry water (Leung, Zhang et al. 2007), wooden tabletops, cages, bins and floors 
(Indriani, Samaan et al. 2010). In our study we have confirmed the importance of 
environmental contamination by showing influenza virus A prevalence in three areas 
of  LBMs:  slaughter  area,  waste  area,  poultry  storage  area.  Traders  who  bring 
 
infected birds to LBMs play a role in perpetuating environmental contamination, while 
traders with healthy birds run the risk of contaminating their birds by storing them in 
contaminated environments. 
Analysis of the N2NA amino acid sequences revealed a stalk deletion is 
present in all viruses, highlighting the sustained poultry adaptation of H9N2 AIVs in 
Vietnam (Sorrell, Song et al. 2010, Thuy, Peacock et al. 2016). However, amino acid 
diversity at residue 180 of the HA protein could play an important role in zoonotic 
potential. Previously we and others have shown that H9N2 viruses carrying the 
A180T/V substitution gain the ability to bind to human-like receptor analogues (Teng, 
Xu et al. 2016, Yang, Punyadarsaniya et al. 2017, Sealy, Yaqub et al. 2019). The 
A180T/V substitution also enhances binding avidity towards avian-like receptor 
analogues, which can attenuate virus replication in vitro, however, the impact of this 
mutation in conjunction with a NA stalk deletion is currently unknown. 
Finally, vaccination against H9N2 has not been adopted in Vietnam, however 
vaccination programmes against H5 are a key component of outbreak response 
measures (Nguyen, Bryant et al. 2014). Both large commercial farms and backyard 
flocks are included in emergency response H5 vaccination programmes (Domenech, 
Dauphin et al. 2009), and discretionary use of routine anti-H5 vaccines is practiced 
within some commercial farms in provinces believed to be high risk. Going forward, 
vaccination in farms in highly connected trade networks where high risk traders 
operate, as identified in this study, may be beneficial in mitigating AIV dissemination. 
 
The primary limitation to our study was that poultry and poultry traders may 
have been repeatedly sampled and questioned during our repeated visits to each 
LBM. We did not record who we had included in our study during the seven day 
sampling periods at each LBM, which meant that if a vendor had unsold chickens 
 
from  a  previous  day  then  we  could  have  sampled  those  birds  multiple  times. 
Likewise, we may have received feedback on poultry trading practices from the 
same vendors multiple times over the sampling period. However, the infection status 
of unsold chickens, and associated poultry trading practices of a vendor may have 
changed as the week progressed, i.e. chickens may have been free of AIV infection 
at the start of the sampling week, but by day two or three, the chickens of the 
repeatedly sampled poultry trader may have become AIV positive. This may be 
reflected by the repeatedly sampled poultry trader having more unsold birds 
compared to earlier in the week. 
 
In conclusion, we have identified poultry trade practices that impact the risk of 
influenza virus A infection in chickens, and we have been able to attribute these 
practices to certain types of poultry trader. Being able to identify a specific type of 
poultry trader responsible for impacting AIV dissemination due to their poultry trading 
practices is novel and could be useful in future surveillance and control programmes. 
H9N2 viruses continue to cause significant poultry outbreaks and expand their global 
distribution within poultry producing countries. It is therefore increasingly important to 
monitor trends in H9N2 epidemiology, by using both active and passive surveillance 
systems that are already in place for H5 pandemic preparedness. Surveillance of 
AIVs is particularly important in countries where there is co-circulation of multiple 
subtypes. Prevention and control of zoonotic risks associated with endemic AIVs 
requires continued surveillance efforts, and cost-effective targeted approaches to 
identify and protect high risk poultry traders in highly connected trade networks. 
 
Methods 
 
 
Sample collection 
 
 
Eight live bird markets (6 retail, 2 wholesale) in four provinces of northern 
Vietnam were included in our study, which was conducted between 2nd October 2017 
and  3rd   December  2017.  Markets  were  selected  if  they  had  previously  been 
confirmed positive for AIV in chickens within the past 12 months according to FAO- 
supported surveillance conducted by the National Centre for Veterinary Diagnostics 
(NCVD, Hanoi) and the Department of Animal Health (DAH, Hanoi). Markets were 
also selected if they were open seven days per week, facilitated the trade of live 
chickens, ducks and pigeons, and had more than 10 poultry traders operating in 
them. There were no quail (live or dead) at any of the LBMs, although this was not 
by design. Each LBM was sampled daily for 7 consecutive days. On each day the 
LBM was sampled, the first 10 traders to arrive who contained at least 5 chickens in 
their flocks were recruited for the study and oropharyngeal swabs were collected 
from 5 chickens in each of their respective flocks, which were then pooled together. 
Selected traders were then asked about their recent trading practices in a closed- 
ended  questionnaire  (Supplementary  information).  A  total  of  493  pools  were 
collected from 2,465 chickens, and swabs were pooled in 2 mL virus transport 
medium (VTM) (Eagle’s minimum essential medium supplemented with gentamicin, 
penicillin, streptomycin, bovine serum albumin, fungizol and HEPES solution) per 
trader and linked to traders and their questionnaire responses (on some days less 
than 10 traders were sampled). Of the 493 sampled poultry traders, seven were 
removed during univariable and multivariable analysis due to incomplete feedback. 
Environmental swabs were taken from three discrete areas of markets to determine 
the level of influenza virus A contamination of LBM environments. These discrete 
 
areas represented different poultry-related work activities which had previously been 
recommended to be included in routine monitoring and surveillance programs for 
avian influenza viruses in LBMs (Indriani, Samaan et al. 2010): 1) slaughter area 
including equipment used for slaughtering birds, 2) waste area including bins and 
containers used for disposing of bird waste such as feathers, 3) poultry stall including 
cages and the vicinity where birds were stored during LBM trading hours. Three 
swab samples were taken from each area and pooled each day (three separate 
pools representing three sampled areas generated per day). All pooled swabs were 
maintained in cold-chain for transportation to NCVD, Hanoi where they were stored 
at -70 oC until further processing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample screening and virus isolation 
 
 
Virus RNA was extracted from pooled-swab VTM using the QIAamp Viral 
RNA Mini kit (Qiagen) as per manufacturer’s protocol. Viral RNA was screened for 
influenza virus A by RT-qPCR using primers for M gene detection (M-5 forward: 
AGATGAGYCTTCTAACCGAGGTCG; M-5 reverse: 
TGCAAANACATCYTCAAGTCTCTG; Probe: FAM-TCAGGCCCCCTCAAAGCCGA- 
BHQ1. The threshold for influenza virus positive samples was Ct <35. Subtyping 
using H5, H7 and H9-specific primers was conducted on M gene positive samples 
with Ct <26 and the threshold for subtype positivity was Ct <38. Thermal cycling 
conditions were: 50°C for 15 min, 95°C for 2 min, then 40 cycles of 95°C for 10 s and 
60°C for 30 s. 
 
To ensure we could obtain sequencing data from our samples we employed 
next generation sequencing (NGS) on PCR products generated from viral RNA taken 
directly from pooled swab samples (Passage 0) and from infected allantoic fluid 
(Passage 1).     Embryonated hens’ eggs were inoculated with VTM from pooled 
swabs which had a Ct <27 for H9 or any Ct for H5 and ‘unknown’ subtype positive 
samples. Allantoic fluid was harvested after 48 hours of incubation and confirmed for 
influenza virus A by haemagglutination (HA) assay. Viral RNA was extracted from 
allantoic fluid as above. In total, 50 samples meeting the above criteria were 
passaged in eggs, and this yielded 34 samples positive for HA activity. Passage 0 
and 1 samples were both subjected to NGS, and where possible, sequencing data 
for passage 0 was used in phylogenetic analysis. Sequencing data was generated 
for a total of 33 viruses (31 H9N2 and 2 H5N6). 
 
 
 
 
Next generation sequencing 
 
 
Multisegment RT-PCR was conducted on viral RNA yielded directly from the 
VTM of pooled swabs and from inoculated allantoic fluid. Briefly, this involved 
multigene amplification using the SuperScriptTM III One-Step RT-PCR kit (Life 
Technologies) and the MBTUni12/13 universal primer set with specificity towards the 
conserved untranslated regions (UTRs) of each influenza virus gene (Zhou, Donnelly 
et al. 2009). These PCR products were used to generate DNA libraries using the 
Nextera XT DNA Library Prep kit (Illumina) and an Illumina MiSeq was used to 
sequence pooled DNA libraries. The resultant sequencing reads were assembled via 
templated assembly in SeqMan NGen and consensus level sequences generated in 
SeqMan Pro (DNASTAR). Sequences were uploaded to the NCBI database with 
 
accession numbers: MN176637-MN176652, MN176660-MN176690, MN176731- 
MN176746, MN176999-MN177029, MN177055-MN177085, MN177086-MN177116, 
MN177518-MN177548 and MN177635-MN177665. 
 
 
 
 
Phylogenetic analysis 
 
 
Alignment and analysis of nucleotide and deduced amino acid sequences was 
conducted using MEGA7 (Kumar, Stecher et al. 2016). Neighbour-joining trees with 
1000 bootstrap replicates were also generated using MEGA7 and reference 
sequences for use in analysis alongside sequencing generated in this study were 
downloaded from the NCBI and GISAID databases. 
 
 
 
 
Statistical analysis 
 
 
All statistical analyses were conducted using RStudio 2016. Data from hard 
copy questionnaires were entered into a Microsoft Access database. Logistic 
regressions  were  used  to  conduct  univariable  analysis  of  explanatory  variables 
where Influenza virus A infection status of each pool of 5 chicken swabs was used 
as the response variable. Explanatory variables with p<0.05 were explored for 
collinearity by computing VIF values with the vif() function in the “car” package. All 
variables with p<0.05 from univariable analysis had VIF<5 so were kept for 
subsequent stepwise variable selection. A final model of explanatory variables with 
LBMs as random effects was used in multivariable analysis. Final selection of 
explanatory variables was conducted by backward stepwise variable selection in R. 
Mantel tests were conducted in the R package, “ecodist”, where virus isolates with 
whole genome sequencing data were included (Mantel 1967). For each of the virus 
 
isolates,  the  ORF  of  each  gene  segment  was  concatenated  and  a  dissimilarity 
matrix, or genetic distance matrix, constructed from the pairwise nucleotide 
differences in MEGA (Kumar, Stecher et al. 2016). Additional dissimilarity matrices 
were also constructed from the explanatory variables of same dimension as the 
genetic distance matrix, and related to the characteristics of the poultry from which 
the viruses were isolated. We refer to them as sample characteristic matrices M. For 
any of those matrices, an element mij=1 if strains i and j are from samples with the 
same characteristic (e.g. poultry sold in the same market, poultry originating from the 
same type of premise, farm or market, poultry originating from the same province), if 
not, mij=0 (e.g. poultry sold in different markets, poultry originating from different 
types of premises, from different provinces). 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Influenza virus A prevalence in selected LBMs 
 
 
 
 
LBM Province Type 
M gene 
Ct<35 
(%) 
H9 
gene 
Ct<38 
H5 
gene 
Ct<38 
 
Subtype 
undetermined 
 
Thi Cau Bac Ninh Retail  
21 
(12.4) 
 
15 2 0 
 
 
 
Do Bac Ninh Retail  
31 
(18.3) 
 
18 3 2 
 
 
Ga Bac Ninh Wholesale 6 (3.5) 3 1 0 
 
 
Ha Vy Hanoi Wholesale 2 (1.1) 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Ngu Hiep Hanoi Retail  
46 
(27.2) 
 
26 7 0 
 
 
Tuc Duyen 
Thai 
Nguyen 
 
Retail 11 (6.5) 7 0 0 
 
 
Ngan Hung Yen Retail 17 (10) 14 0 0 
 
 
Pho Hien Hung Yen Retail 
35 
 
26 3 0 
  (20.7)   
Total 169 109 16 2 
 
 
Data represent pooled oropharyngeal swabs. From the 169 pools positive for 
influenza virus A, 113 were subtyped. 14 samples were positive for both H5 and H9. 
Subtype undetermined refers to samples that were positive for M gene but negative 
for H5, H7 and H9 subtype by RT-qPCR. No sequencing data was available for 
these samples. 
 
Target Buyer Consumer 209 (43) 125 82 6.84 
4. 
11 
8- 
<0.001 
.17 
 Vendor 107 (22) 12 97 0.55 0.26 -1.10 0.15 
 
 
 
Table 2. Univariable analysis of potential risk factors for Influenza virus A infection in chickens 
 
 
 
 
Variable Response level 
Median 
(Range) 
 
Observations (%) 
Influenza A 
positive 
 
Influenza A 
negative 
Odds 
Ratio 
(OR) 
 
CI95 
 
for OR P-value 
Time spent at LBM 
Numerical 
(hours) 
 
5 (1-24) 168 318 0.96 0.91-1.00 0.07 
 
 
Both 170 (35) 31 139 1 
2 
 
 
 
 
Number of different 
sources 
Numerical 1 (1-4) 168 318 1.53 0.87-2.70 0.13
 
 
Sourced from 
backyard farm (<50 
birds) 
Yes 112 (23) 40 71 1.09 0.69-1.68 0.71 
 
No 374 (77) 128 247 1 
 
 
Sourced from small 
commercial farm 
(50-500 birds) 
Yes 102 (21) 29 71 0.73 0.44-1.16 0.19 
 
No 384 (79) 139 247 1 
 
 
Sourced from large 
commercial farm 
(>500 birds) 
Yes 160 (33) 17 141 0.14 0.07-0.23 <0.001 
 
No 325 (67) 151 177 1 
 
 
 
Sourced from 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
58 (12) 
 
 
38 
 
 
18 
 
 
4.87 
 
 
2.71-9.03 
 
 
<0.001 
another LBM No 428 (88) 130 300 1   
 
 
 
 
Sourced by a Yes 97 (20) 53 43 2.95 1.86-4.67 <0.001 
middleman No 389 (80) 115 275 1   
 
 
 
Chickens sold/day 
 
Numerical 
 
30 (1-2400) 
 
168 
 
318 
 
0.39 
 
0.31-0.47 
 
<0.001 
 
 
Ducks Sold/day 
Numerical 0 (0-60) 168 318 1.07 1.03-1.09 <0.001 
 
 
Pigeons sold/day 
Numerical 0 (0-100) 168 318 1.15 1.07-1.27 <0.001 
 
Days with unsold 
birds 
Numerical 4 (0-7) 168 318 1.43 1.32-1.55 <0.001
 
 
 
Chickens unsold/day Numerical 7 (0-1000)  168 318 0.99 0.98-0.99 0.01 
 
 
Ducks unsold/day 
 
 
Numerical 
 
 
0 (0-30) 
   
168 
 
 
318 
 
 
1.32 
 
 
1.21-1.45 
 
 
<0.001 
 
 
Storage location of 
        
unsold birds 
All birds sold
  
78 (16) 10 70 1 
 
Home 
 
 
364 (75) 
 
157 
 
209 5.25 
2.74- 
<0.001 
11.15 
 
LBM 
 
 
44 (9) 
 
1 
 
39 0.18 
0.009- 
0.09 
0.98 
 
Resupply frequency Every two days 
  
39 (8) 
 
16 
 
24 
 
1 
Everyday  345 (71) 111 236 0.67 0.34-1.24 0.31 
≤3 days/week  102 (21) 41 58 1.06 0.50-2.26 0.88 
 
 
 
Vaccination status No 199 (41) 82 117 1  
 Yes 287 (59) 86 201 0.61 0.41-0.89 0.01 
 
Number of LBMs 
visited/week 
Numerical 1 (1-5) 168 318 1.19 0.77-1.81 0.41
 
 
 
Number of visits to 
current LBM/week 
Numerical 7 (1-7) 168 318 1.80 1.46-2.24 <0.001
 
 
 
The total number of samples used in univariable and multivariable analyses was 486 after samples with incomplete questionnaires 
were removed. 
 
Table 3. Multivariable analysis identifying risk factors for influenza virus A 
infection in chickens 
 
 
 
Potential risk factors 
Odds Ratio 
(OR) 
CI95 for 
OR 
P- 
value 
 
Selling only to consumers 2.72 1.52-4.84 <0.001 
 
 
Buying from middlemen 2.05 1.14-3.66 0.02 
 
 
Number of chickens sold/day 0.48 0.24-0.97 0.04 
 
 
Number of ducks unsold/day 1.33 1.02-1.78 0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree of H9 HA. Neighbour joining tree representing phylogeny of 
H9HA sequences generated in this study; reference strains from NCBI and GISAID 
databases are included for comparison. Trees were formed with 1000 bootstrap replicates, 
bootstrap values <70 are not shown. In blue are reference Vietnam strains, in red are strains 
from this study, in black are non-Vietnam strains, and in fuchsia are recent (2016-2018) 
human isolates. Blue markers represent sub-genotypes which contain more than one virus 
sequenced in this study: filled circle is VN2, filled diamond is VN4, and filled square is VN5. 
 
Figure 2. Sub-genotypes of H9N2 viruses. Viruses with full genome sequencing data 
could be assigned to seven sub-genotypes and are represented here. Gene segments of a 
different colour indicate >2% nucleotide difference. 
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